The long-awaited report investigating how county officers didn’t order well timed evacuations for west Altadena because the Eaton fireplace threatened the group didn’t assign blame for the botched alerts, as a substitute chalking the difficulty as much as an evening of chaos, unprecedented situations and poor communication.
The 132-page report launched Thursday appeared to downplay how early the fireplace threatened west Altadena — regardless of 911 calls that reported flames and smoke within the space — and solely as soon as talked about the 19 individuals who died within the fireplace, of which all however one had been discovered within the city’s western aspect.
As an alternative, it centered on the fireplace’s “good storm,” poor preparation and the truth that the satellite-outlined “fireplace entrance” hadn’t entered west Altadena till 5 a.m. after evacuation alerts had been issued, although a number of spot fires had been confirmed within the space earlier within the night time.
The impartial investigation by consulting agency McChrystal Group, launched eight months after the Los Angeles space firestorm, got here after The Instances revealed that the county didn’t concern evacuation alerts in west Altadena till hours after smoke and flames from the Eaton Hearth threatened the group.
Whereas areas east of Lake bought evacuation orders simply after 7 p.m. on Jan. 7, most of west Altadena didn’t obtain any evacuation alerts till 3:30 a.m. Some zones didn’t obtain alerts till nearly 6 a.m., hours after individuals started reporting fireplace within the space to 911.
Officers advised the Instances that the accountability to concern evacuation orders was cut up between three companies: the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Division, the Los Angeles County Hearth Division and the county Workplace of Emergency Administration.
However Los Angeles County Sheriff Robert Luna later downplayed his division’s function, saying firefighters sometimes take the lead as a result of they’re “the consultants” in such conditions. The Workplace of Emergency Administration, which is accountable for sending out alerts, mentioned there have been no technical points.
With out assigning blame or explaining what went mistaken, the report confirmed that between 1 and three a.m. Jan. 8, the county didn’t ship out any evacuation alerts — together with none to west Altadena. The report mentioned that at the moment, “all areas [L.A. county fire officials] believed had been straight impacted by or in danger from the Eaton Hearth had already acquired an evacuation warning or order.”
However that was clearly not the case.
The primary evacuation order for west Altadena got here at 3:25 a.m., after dispatchers acquired not less than 14 stories of fireplace within the space, based on 911 logs from the Los Angeles County Hearth Division obtained by The Instances.
The report mentioned that the preliminary requires fireplace didn’t match the placement of destroyed buildings, showing to query the validity of these early calls and the presence of flames. The report claimed that the primary 911 name for a fireplace in west Altadena the place the construction was later confirmed broken got here simply earlier than 1 a.m. Jan. 8. — nonetheless greater than two hours earlier than evacuation orders had been issued.
The stories offers two examples of fireplace division employees flagging that the fireplace could also be burning west greater than an hour earlier than evacuations alerts went out for west Altadena.
A hearth division employees within the discipline in Altadena mentioned they instructed to Unified Command employees slightly earlier than midnight on Jan. 8 that attributable to excessive winds, evacuation orders ought to exit for the foothills of Altadena, all the way in which to La Cañada. Unified Command employees mentioned they didn’t recall this occurring and that the fireplace entrance was not shifting west on the time.
About two hours later, at 2:18, a discipline personnel from the county fireplace division radioed in that they noticed fireplace north of Farnsworth park shifting west alongside the foothills.
Although some officers current within the decision-making course of advised investigators they’d taken notes within the discipline about evacuation choices, the notes “had been both incomplete, not time-stamped, or not maintained.”
“No official type or documentation was utilized by LACoFD, LASD or OEM to collectively and formally document which zones ought to obtain evacuation orders or warnings, the time the choice was made, or the time the zones had been communicated to OEM employees on the EOC.”
The report additionally talked about — with out naming particular individuals or companies — that the county “had issues about over-warning” throughout the fireplace, worrying about including confusion, panic or pointless site visitors points. State pointers on alert and warning techniques explicitly warn towards this, as have consultants, repeatedly.
The report mentioned that based mostly on satellite tv for pc information from the Nationwide Guard, the fireplace entrance didn’t cross into western Altadena till round 5 a.m., two hours after evacuation orders had been issued. The report acknowledged that 911 calls had been coming in from the realm hours earlier than the orders, however categorized these incidents as “spot fires.”
The report repeatedly mentions how situations created a “good storm” for firefighters, whereas highlighting that there appeared to be an actual focus about NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab catching fireplace, which might launch poisonous fumes if ignited.
Whereas the fireplace initially burned eastward, firefighters quickly reported that it was spreading “all over the place abruptly” with wind gusts between 70-90 MPH.
“Evacuation choices and messages couldn’t hold tempo with the fireplace,” the report acknowledged.
The report additionally claims that the fireplace entered west Altadena as wind speeds elevated, describing it as a “extra densely populated” space with older properties constructed with supplies that had been “extra susceptible to ignition.”
The report discovered a number of issues with how the county carries out evacuations. Generally, when officers evacuated a zone, they might routinely evacuate the zone subsequent to it. However that observe was not codified and didn’t occur in western Altadena.
The three companies in cost additionally didn’t have a single platform with which to coordinate communication, exacerbating points with decision-making throughout the fireplace response, the report discovered. Sheriff’s division employees might not have been conscious in actual time of which zones had been below evacuation warnings or orders, as they weren’t all the time aspect by aspect with different companies at unified command, based on the report.
The report was performed by The McChrystal Group, a consulting agency with expertise assessing authorities response to pure disasters. The report included dozens of interviews with fireplace and county officers in addition to public listening classes.
Some who attended the classes mentioned they had been cathartic. Others mentioned they had been skeptical a lot would come of the county-funded report.
“I feel it’s going to be extra sizzling air to cowl the county’s ass,” mentioned Shawna Dawson Beer. whose residence burned down within the Eaton Hearth. “I don’t count on any actual accountability.”
Throughout a Might 7 listening session, residents repeatedly advised the consultants that their evacuation orders had been dangerously delayed. “None of us actually acquired alerts,” mentioned one lady.
County officers largely declined to reply questions on what went mistaken with the delayed evacuation alerts, citing the continued probe. The McChrystal Group additionally didn’t reply questions, solely issuing two updates over the previous few months, although neither contained any substantive info.
In 2019, nearly a 12 months after the Woolsey fireplace, an analogous report ready by Citygate Associates detailed how a number of simultaneous fires strained first responders’ potential to prioritize the place to ship individuals. The blaze destroyed some 1,600 buildings and killed three individuals.
Related points had been discovered with the county’s response this January, based on the 2025 report. Each stories questioned the knowledge of additional improvement in fire-prone areas, given officers’ acknowledged incapacity to defend the huge variety of Californians who dwell inside excessive danger areas.
A Instances investigation additionally discovered that the majority county fireplace vans didn’t shift into west Altadena till lengthy after it was ravaged by fireplace. Many county fireplace vans had already been deployed to the Palisades fireplace and to east Altadena. Marrone mentioned the shortage of fireplace vans in west Altadena most likely boiled all the way down to “human error” by fireplace officers who determined the place the vans ought to transfer.
